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This paper focuses on the set of ideological means and systems of scholarly argu-
mentation presented by the field of geographical science between the two world
wars in an attempt to prove the unity of the Hungarian national space and demon-
strate the impracticability of the spatial confines within which the state had to exist
due to the ruling implemented after the Paris Peace Treaty. Specifically, I will elab-
orate on the geographical myths used to legitimize the so-called Hungarian state
space, with special attention devoted to ethnic mapping as an ethno-political device
and means of articulating discourses of power discourse.
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It is perhaps not by chance that geography, or “the science of space,” is now in-
cluded in academic discussions of the processes of nation-building. This may be
simply because in order for the field of history to be able to interpret the nuances
of potential approaches to the rather complex relationship between society and
space or spatiality, it is necessary to implement the viewpoints offered by other
disciplines as well.
At the end of the 19th century geography on the one hand found its appropriate
place among sciences and scholarly disciplines and, on the other hand, managed
to clarify its proper subject matter. A central concern became the detailed analysis
of the natural environment that surrounds humankind as well as the (external) en-
vironment that human beings themselves shape and transform around themselves,
along with the interpretation of spatial correlations. In other words, in the schol-
arly/scientific philosophy related to geography, the concept of space appeared as
the uniform basic issue of the discipline of geography. According to Karl Ritter,
however, space is not empty, but “filled with objects,” which means that this con-
cept is based on the absolute theory of space. However, the view of space as an
“objective container” became more and more diversified in the second half of the
past century, and spatial concepts and spatial theories appeared in the process of
what could be assessed as a “spatial turn” in scholarly-scientific thinking, which
tended to regard space increasingly as one of the projections of social processes.
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As the appearance of “soft” spatial concepts facilitated the approach of geography
(a discipline that moves essentially in the synchronic time frame) towards the ap-
plication of the achievements and methods of social sciences and the recognition
of the diachronic aspect, the field of history, which is basically vertical in its treat-
ment of time, was equally forced to move closer to spatial philosophical thinking
and social geography by the declaration and acceptance of spatial synchronicities
and parallel worlds (see Soja, 1989). This is exactly why, as a matter of course, ge-
ography uses archives and various records of drafts and censuses (among other
things), as the historical spatial processes can be interpreted correctly only with
the help of these sources, just as these sources may also provide logical and schol-
arly explanations for the phenomena of natural geography. This means that the
historical viewpoint (and sources) can enrich and simultaneously highlight the ap-
proach of geography by adding an additional aspect that has proved to be a basic
concern of geography, which is temporaneity.
After all, we all know for a fact that time is the concern of cartographers. The
human branch of classical geography focused primarily on the external, environ-
mental (spatial) relations of human presence, the order of social activities and of
the population itself as shaped in the (absolute) space through historical develop-
ment, and it used to concentrate pointedly on the present, even if it used historical
data as well. Conversely, present-day geography has (“at last”) turned this rela-
tionship upside down. It does not anymore discuss temporal processes from the
aspect of space, but rather addresses spatial structures that are formed on the basis
of historical processes. This path seems to be appropriate for the purpose of ap-
proaching mythical ideas in geography with due criticism and for providing rea-
sonable explanations for the origin of natural forms “created by supernatural pow-
ers.” It is in this context, i.e., by considering the time horizon, that we need to ap-
proach the former (and sometimes also even the present) ideological construc-
tions of Hungarian geography, constructions with which it has interpreted the spa-
tial imprint of the (national/ethnic) presence of Hungarians in the Carpathian Ba-
sin. This seems to be all the more the case, given that a deeply rooted feature in
Hungarian geography and even scholarship in general is the declaration of how
Hungarians are bound to their natural environment and landscape, which finds ex-
pression in the principle of “a history and culture that could happen only here and
only in this way.” The interpretation of this basic principle, i.e., that of the triad of
place, historical time, and natural environment may move towards the establish-
ment of creation myths. The forced amalgamation or confusion of empirical or
historical time and the huge time periods of natural processes (e.g., geological for-
mations) can only result in the acceptance of the tenet of “created space.” Thus ac-
cording to this way of thinking, the events that create our geographical environ-
ment necessarily determined our historical processes and gave our (national) spa-
tial structures the form they have today.
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For easily understandable reasons, Hungarian geography between the two
world wars put special emphasis on the efforts to explain the questions surround-
ing the issues of landscape, space, and nation and the close-knit (or even fateful)
relationship that developed between them in the wake of the shocking decision
made at the Paris Peace Treaty. This should not be surprising, however, as it has
been recognized for some time in contemporary social research, due to the work
of Pierre Nora and Alieda Assmann, that the most original, most ancient, and most
important part in national cultural memory is played by space (Nora, 1990;
Assmann, 2003).
Entire landscapes can become the medium of cultural memory and may be
filled with semiotic content. As a consequence, the conscious acts of the local
population to harmonize the given part of space with certain mythic notions have
been very important in the process of strengthening their ethnic/national identity
in the past as well as the present (Gribben, 1990, 277–91).
Veikko Anttonen, interpreting the term “sacral,” has analyzed the connection
between space and religion and, with the help of this viewpoint, indirectly dis-
cussed the so-called “sacred” functioning of national spaces. Anttonen contends
that individual communities mark the special points of the area they use as early as
the time of their settlement of the given area. These include natural places (such as
rivers, lakes, or hills) that separate their own space from the (wilderness) areas of
the “other” group(s) of people. In Finnish culture, the basically adjectival term
“pyhä” (meaning “separate” or “highlighted from the environment”) expresses
the significance of such locations, the significance of spatial points as borders and
boundaries between peoples, the crossing of which is considered to be of magical
or religious nature. Transgressing these borders is only possible after the appro-
priate, i.e., socially prescribed, rituals. The decoding of the meaning of these sa-
cral borders or boundaries is possible only for those who belong to the given com-
munities (Anttonen, 1999, 9–22).
In this context the reasons for the existence of the Hungarian political/national
space area theory can be understood as a part of historical geography, as the range
of the Carpathian Mountains and the area surrounded by it never constituted
merely simple geographical frames, but always had a distinctive role for Hungari-
ans.
The notion of the thousand-year-old country of Saint Stephen as a “Sacral
Unity” became especially strong after 1920 (see Zeidler, 2001, 2002). This meant
that in scholarly life in Hungary not only Ratzel’s principle of “nature created
Hungary through the complete organic correlation as a unified life province” held
sway, but also the idea of how “something more” or “some Larger Power” as-
sisted in creating the natural (sacral) space of the Hungarian nation. Thus, in the
last decade of the 19th century and in the first few decades of the 20th an aspira-
tion took root in Hungarian scholarly circles to proclaim the idea of a unified na-
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tional and state space, very similar to the notion of an organic, unified national
history and folk culture.
It was precisely this “nature-given created state space” that the government
feared, as early as the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, was endangered by
the ethnic minorities living in Hungary, which is why the government paid in-
creasingly close attention to the spatial situation and spatial movements of
non-Hungarians and their “space-occupying power,” which was seen as a force
that might drive back Hungarians. The best scholarly/scientific tool for monitor-
ing these processes was what is referred to as the ethnic map.
The history of ethnic cartography contains reports of a number of newly cre-
ated ethnic maps dating from the first half of the 20th century that deploy increas-
ingly refined methods of delineation. We know for a fact, as noted by Pál Teleki,
that it was expressly out of political interests that ethnic maps were produced for
the peace treaties that brought an official end to World War I. According to
semiotics, maps are icons or pictorial sign(al)s that bear some sort of resemblance
to their subjects. However, the universal codification of maps also results in an in-
evitable simplification of reality and, thus, given their inherent abstraction, maps
cannot be seen as anything more than conceptual models. Yet the intensive gener-
alization highlights only those features of macro-level ethnic processes displayed
in maps of small scale relations (based on single-word statistical responses) that
provide a superficial, if perhaps spectacular impression of the most basic ethnic
components (structure) of a given area.
Due precisely to this quality, the history of the establishment of modern Euro-
pean nation states demonstrates that the ethnic/linguistic maps and statistics were
either made on the basis of ideological considerations in the first place or they rep-
resented/represent a possibility for exploitation according to the current (nation
state) political interests.
In one of his treatises, Pál Teleki himself acknowledges that, for all the most
painstaking scholarly efforts put into the project, it is simply impossible to pro-
duce a “politically neutral” ethnic map in the middle of Europe that would be ac-
ceptable for all, since it is exactly the non-correspondence of the individual ethnic
and state boundaries that causes the basic antagonistic conflicts between the peo-
ples of this region (Teleki, 1937, 60–70). In Hungarian cartographic practice, the
above attribute (“spectacular”) refers to optical and psychological effects that are
not featured as the subject matter of individual studies but represent parts and par-
cels of a tacit agreement legitimized by the history of the science of ethnic cartog-
raphy: namely, the legend and colors used in the maps. The various charts, dia-
grams, and other means of representation (including circles, balloons, cubes, and
columns) may lead the non-specialist viewer of a map astray when assessing de-
grees of magnitude. Even colors can exert an irrational and/or emotional influence
on people that may result in totally differing perceptions or overall impressions
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concerning the size of areas occupied by individual ethnic groups or their mere
“capacity to occupy certain areas.” Cartographers have a way of determining
where the colors should be tense, where they should attract or concentrate atten-
tion, or even where they should decrease the interest or the intentness of the
viewer. Apart from the central use of red or gules, the application of colors in eth-
nic maps can only be interpreted in relation to that central color of red. Cartogra-
phers have made, and continue to make, their decisions concerning the representa-
tion of individual coloring codes in maps primarily on the basis of the color effects
as related to the color red.
Imre Jakabffy (1915–2006), along with Pál Teleki and András Rónai
(1906–91) one of the editors and producers of ethnic maps in the third and fourth
decades of the twentieth century, revealed to me in an interview once that the
color red was predominantly used in the above fashion, i.e., for demonstrating the
“area-occupying” power of one’s own ethnicity:
Red is an attractive color. The color red has a magnifying effect. If
that happens to be the case, let us then make it our single effect and
concept that we appropriate red for ourselves. [This is] because no
matter who produces an ethnographical map, he or she will invari-
ably reserve red for his or her own ethnicity. If it is a Slovakian [car-
tographer], the Slovakians will be marked with red. […] Red is, so to
speak, a color that irritates your neighbors. […] The color red pro-
duces an explosion. This is why your own nation is always red (Inter-
view with Imre Jakabffy, December 27th, 2004).
The other method, employed less frequently, is when the color red marks an eth-
nicity that “endangers,” “threatens” or “intrudes into” one’s own territory. These
latter, usually large-scale maps are normally prepared for detailed micro-exami-
nations of settlements of disputed affiliation along ethnic borderlines. A plastic
example for this sort of coloring would be the map bearing the title A ma-
gyar–szlovák nyelvhatár vidékének … [… of the Area of the Hungarian–Slovak
Language Boundary], published in 1942 by Államtudományi Intézet [Institute of
Political Sciences; verbatim: State Studies Institute]. In this map, the Slovak eth-
nic territory is marked with the color red (see the exposition of colors in
Keményfi, 2007, 55–65). Although ethnic maps apply all of the various
contrastive effects simultaneously, the population density map of Pál Teleki is of
particular interest from the perspective of color choice. What we can observe in
this map is the joint effect of quality and quantity of light and shade contrasts and
the resulting pervasive energy of red. It is not by chance that this map of popula-
tion density by Teleki is oftentimes unofficially dubbed the “Carte rouge” because
of the striking dominance of the color red.1 This map seems to achieve its most
conspicuous effect through what is not really its primary objective. With scholarly
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precision, Teleki uses red (“Hungarian”) only to indicate the territories where the
level of population density would demand it, thus embedding these ethnic Hun-
garian areas in narrower or broader white frames of unpopulated sections, a tech-
nique giving the impression that the larger red blocks seem to be moving forward
towards us in space from the otherwise flat plane of the sheet.
In my view, ethnic maps do not essentially belong within the scope of academi-
cally strict cartographic scholarship. To use a concept coined by the Austrian so-
cial scientist and theoretician Otto Neurath, ethnic cartography is but a “method of
pictorial statistics.” It is a method of presentation “which we want to use when the
pictorial demonstration for introducing our concept or ideology promises a lot
more than words do” (Neurath, 1991, 423). A further characteristic feature of
maps is that they provide a key or legend to the universally standardized codes.
The cartographers are supposed to tell us what the shades, colors, and contours in-
dicate, or what surface objects they represent. Thus, the interpretive processes of
the makers of maps must correspond somehow to the interpretive processes of
viewers (Gombrich, 2003, 98–100).
The branch of presenting cartographic practice according to Otto Neurath’s
school of picture education urges that, in the process of education, the universally
valid codes used in maps should be introduced as early as possible. This is also as-
sisted, for example, by the explicit and unambiguous color code, used consistently
already in the early phases of education. As an example, he gives the green color
of the Arab world, which immediately (as an acquired skill) facilitates the identifi-
cation of the character of the given territory on the map. Ethnic maps in the efforts
related to the nation-state status of Central European peoples have become
“graphic icons” or symbols of national and territorial unity. Following in the foot-
steps of Umberto Eco, we could also say that we normally compare ‘stored im-
ages” with data perceived at any given point in time. A correspondence between
the two operates the iconic code, which triggers the process through which we can
get to the level of proper recognition and identification, in our case of the map
(Eco, 1976, 191–217).
In my view the ethnic map sequences prepared by the so-called civilized na-
tions of Central Europe depend heavily on the specific situations in which they ap-
pear. In other words, we have to take into consideration the concrete medium in
which they figure. Ethnic maps of the more comprehensive type, which cover
larger individual areas, play a part in symbolic political/ethnic conflicts even to-
day. One needs only think of the public administration transformation processes
that have taken place in these countries. The question of where and how these
maps are actually used should then be analyzed separately from this perspective.
As a practicing ethnographer in the course of fieldwork, I have repeatedly stum-
bled across recently prepared Hungarian ethnic maps in the cultural venues or
mayors’ offices (where they are generally kept “sub rosa” and rolled up, but still
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turn up every now and then) of small Hungarian villages of the region called
Felvidék (present-day southern Slovakia).
A Hungarian cartographer producing ethnic maps has also told me that, in a
number of cases, these maps were ordered explicitly by minority political organi-
zations, and it was the “commissioner” who decided, for example, what color
code to apply. Yet this is no secret at all, as the website of MTA Földrajzi Kutató-
intézet [Geographical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences]
even lists the ethnic cartographical research projects supported directly by gov-
ernment and minority organizations (see http://www.mtafki.hu/projekt_tf.htm).
In other words, ethnic maps are the pictorial channels of symbolic ethnic con-
flicts, the instruments of pictorial dialogues or map-like coded messages between
ethnicities, which sometimes have only symbolic and other times real and even
grave consequences. Mostly, they represent a message either to the neighboring
peoples or to the European political decision-makers and, of course, a message to
the ethnic groups themselves (in this case the Hungarians) about their numbers
and circumstances in the given regions. As an example of this “dialogue,” let me
cite a brochure written in German for international audiences edited by Imre
Jakabffy and published in 1942 in order to refute the fabrications contained in Ro-
manian ethnic maps. Once we get a chance to look into this publication, it be-
comes quite clear that a considerable amount of energy was put into the effort of
adjusting or refuting the Romanian ethnic maps (Jakabffy, 1942). (Why does car-
tographic practice elicit such heated responses or move such a great extent of
methodological apparatuses?) It is surely not by chance, then, that cartographer
Ute Schneider mentions the power of maps in the title of a recently published vol-
ume (Schneider, 2004).
Furthermore, it might not sound too far-fetched on my part to suggest that, on
the basis of military literature, it is quite apparent on the basis of how they operate
(as special techniques) that ethnic maps also have their proper niche in the system
of psychological warfare (Watson, 1985, 364–77).
Apart from the most imposing and widespread ethnic maps, Hungarian schol-
arship has also presented a mythic system of arguments (that could be illustrated
with the following list of examples) for the purpose of proclaiming the magnitude
and unity of the Hungarian national space.
1. In the 1920s, geographer Gyula Prinz came up with the so-called Tisia The-
ory. According to Prinz, the ancient crystalline block that had sunk to the bottom
of the Alföld [Great Plains] is of a homogeneous structure, and the range of the
Carpathian Mountains then was rolled up on and around this block as if on a
(boot)last. Prinz reckoned that this uniform bedrock base also demarcated a uni-
fied state space. This means that Hungary, the state is nothing less than the “im-
pact” of nature; consequently, only this state space can function or operate effec-
tively in the Carpathian Basin (Figure 1).
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2. Prinz is responsible for the notion of “Magyar Mezopotámia” [Hungarian
Mesopotamia], as well. The natural basis for this idea is that Hungarian culture de-
veloped on the surface of an alluvial plain. This sort of natural environment was
the precondition of great civilizations based on agriculture. In other words, the in-
trinsic Duna–Tisza [Danubius–Tibiscus] river structure, which is similar to that of
the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, would elevate Hungary to the status of a
Mesopotamian country (Figure 2). This is how the central Hungarian area could
become the distributing core of culture and how this culture could be radiated to-
wards the neighboring peoples, who also lived together with us in the Carpathian
Basin. Our “cultural power” therefore “elevated” the cultural level of the other
peoples who lived with us on the edges of the Carpathian Basin. Accordingly, the
end or the borderline of the highbrow “core culture” is located where the territory
populated by Hungarians ends, or where the plains shift into the Carpathian
Mountains.
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‘Even the bedrock
demarcates
the Hungarian
state space’
Figure 1. The Tisia Block Myth
Figure 2. “Hungarian Mesopotamia”
3. The concept of ethnic/national landscape propounded and emphasized by
Teleki is also worthy of mention in this context. The essential idea in it is that an
ethnic landscape is “egy-egy nemzetiség tipikusan a saját etnikai jellegzetes-
ségeiben felismerhetõ tájformáló erõ által alakított térfelszín” [the space surface
formed by a landscape-forming power recognizable in the typical ethnic features
of individual nations]. The term that entered the Hungarian language from the rel-
evant German literature assumed the ethnic quality to be a primary space-sur-
face-forming force, as opposed to a simple way of life. Obviously, this piece of
specific terminology, already refuted and discredited by current representatives of
geography, was supposed to justify the historical continuity of the given group of
people related to a concrete part of the landscape.
4. The notion of sacred/sacral landscape (szent táj), received with some degree
of skepticism even by contemporary (first half of the 20th century) representatives
in the field of the ethnography of religion, also belongs here. Their disbelief
stemmed from their view that the definition of sacral landscape ignored the com-
plexity of landscape.
5. The man who coined the term, the German Georg Schreiber, also included in
the original definition the German life-force as that of a “gigantic great-family.”
He opined that there was a close connection between the “people” (Volkstum) and
the “sacred quality.” He believed that the relationship between religiousness and
the people could be best recognized in sacral landscapes. In other words, it was its
deep religiousness that had helped the German people (and protected them against
other peoples) in their effort to preserve their life force and high level of culture
and civilization and leave the impression of this culture in the landscape
(Bausinger, 1965, 177–204). In Hungarian circles of geography, this notion took
the form of the following characteristic sentence: “A katolicizmus a nyugatias
lelkiséget biztosítja a magyarság számára, kiélezi a magyar mûveltségi életteret”
[Catholicism ensures the western spirituality for Hungarians; it puts an edge to the
Hungarian educational life-space] (Prinz, 1942, 129).
6. The last item in this list, admittedly abbreviated in the interests of concision
and brevity, could be the idea of államhatár-tartósság [state border continuity],
developed to a level or remarkable subtlety by András Rónai. On the basis of the
mythic principle according to which “time legitimizes,” Rónai handles the
Carpathian Basin as a natural state space unit, which is un-detachable and totally
independent of ethnic or national processes and historical events. He does so be-
cause the range of the Carpathians has proven to be the most lasting state border in
Europe. If this should be the case, we might safely assume that some sort of a natu-
ral (and not social) power prescribed this line of demarcation to function as a static
state border (Figure 3).
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These concepts reflect the inner system of relationships between the three is-
sues of territory, nation, and national minority. To wit, nation states in the central
and south-eastern parts of Europe attempt to express the cultural and linguistic
fault lines separating the peoples living here in spatial terms as well. The roots of
the notion of ethnic space are to be found in the fundamental characteristic feature
of nascent nationalism in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: the effort to
establish the maxim that state borders must correspond to ethnic borders. The rea-
son for this is that those who live outside the legal framework of a given state but
speak the same language and possess the same culture are also to be included in
the “myth of common origin.” The ideology of nationalism dawning in the pro-
cess of the development of modern nation states gradually “discovered” the exis-
tence and the importance of “an ethnic space of one’s own” after establishing na-
tional institutions and handling issues of language and culture. Therefore, the next
step within the framework of nationalism was the mythologization and sac-
ralization of this space.
The disciplines of statistics, cartography, and geography in the first half of the
20th century fulfilled expectations according to which geographers and cartogra-
phers should add the findings and achievements from their respective fields to the
effort to prove the legitimacy of the notion of the leading role of the Hungarian na-
tion in politics and culture in the Carpathian Basin. The arguments listed above
represent the contemporary concepts of spatial studies that eventually combined
into a unified network to serve a common goal.
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The thicker the line,
the longer it has been
a state border.
Figure 3. ‘Time legitimizes the state borders’
References
Veikko Anttonen (1999) Ihmisen ja maan rajat. “Pyhä” kulttuurisena kategoriana. Suomalaisen
Kirjallisuuden Seuran toimituksia 646. Helsinki, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura; Veikko
Anttonen (1999) ‘Nation and its Territory as Ritualized Space: Examining the Concept of the
Sacred as a Boundary Marker in Finland’ in Elek Bartha and Róbert Keményfi (eds)
Ethnographica et Folkloristica Carpathica Tom. 11. Debrecen: Publications of the Department
of Ethnography at the University of Debrecen, 9–22.
Alieda Assmann (2003) Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen
Gedächtnisses (München).
Hermann Bausinger (1965) ‘Volksideologie und Volksforschung. Zur nationalsozialistischen
Volkskunde’, Zeitschrift für Volkskunde, Vol. 61, 177–204.
Umberto Eco (1976) A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomintgon).
Ernst H. Gombrich (1999) The Uses of Images. Studies in the Social Function of Art and Visual
Communication (London: Phaidon).
Arthur Gribben (1990) ‘Táin Bó Cuailnge: A Place On The Map, A Place on The Mind’. Western
Folklore, Vol. 49 (July), 277–91.
[Imre Jakabffy] 1942. Rumänische Landkartenfälschungen und ihre Kritik (Budapest: Staat-
wissenschaftliche Institut).
Róbert Keményfi (2007) ‘Karten machen – Macht der Farben. Zur frage der Visualisierung des
ungarischennationalen Raumes’, in Sabine Tzsaschel, Holger Wild and Sebastian Lent (Hrsg.):
Visualisierung des Raumes. Karten machen – die Macht der Karten (Leipzig: Leibniz Institut
für Länderkunde) 55–65.
Otto Neurath (1991) Gesammelte bildpädagogische Schriften. Band 3 (Wien).
Pierre Nora (1990) Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis (Berlin).
Gyula Prinz (1942) Magyarország földrajza (Budapest: Renaissance Könyvkiadóvállalat).
Ute Schneider (2004) Macht der Karten (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag).
Edward W. Soja (1989) Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social The-
ory (London and New York).
Pál Teleki (1937) ‘Egy néprajzi térképrõl’, Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. 65, 60–70.
Peter Watson (1985) Psycho-Krieg (Farnkfurt am Main: Econ).
Miklós Zeidler (2001) A revíziós gondolat (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó).
Miklós Zeidler (2002) A magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború között (Budapest: Teleki
László Alapítvány).
Note
1 See the Map: http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Ethnographic_map_of_hungary_
1910_by_teleki_carte_rouge.jpg
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